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Abstract. Public-key cryptography is widely used to
provide Internet security services. The public-key infras-
tructure (PKI) is the infrastructure that supports the
public-key cryptography, and the revocation of certiﬁ-
cates implies one of its major costs. The goal of this art-
icle is to explain in detail a certiﬁcate revocation system
based on the Merkle hash tree (MHT) called AD–MHT.
AD–MHT uses the data structures proposed by Naor and
Nissim in their authenticated dictionary (AD) [20]. This
work describes the tools used and the details of the AD–
MHT implementation. The authors also address import-
ant issues not addressed in the original AD proposal, such
as responding to a request, revoking a certiﬁcate, delet-
ing an expired certiﬁcate, the status checking protocol for
communicating the AD–MHT repository with the users,
verifying a response, system security, and, ﬁnally, per-
formance evaluation.
Keywords: Public-key infrastructure – Certiﬁcate revo-
cation – Merkle hash tree
1 Introduction
Distributed environments such as the Internet need an
eﬀective way of providing basic security services such as
user authentication, access control, conﬁdentiality, infor-
mation integrity, and nonrepudiation. In such environ-
ments, public-key cryptography is widely used as a cryp-
tographic basis for these services.
In public-key cryptography, two keys are used, one
“public” (i.e., known by everybody) the other “private”
(i.e., secret). The public key is usually made public by
way of a digital document called a certiﬁcate. A certiﬁ-
cate is valid because it is signed digitally by a Trusted
Third Party (TTP), called the “issuer”.1 There are sev-
eral kinds of certiﬁcates (actually, any data that contains
a digital signature can be considered a certiﬁcate), but
the most widely used are identity certiﬁcates (ICs), whose
main function is to bind a public key with an identity. An
IC states an association between a name called a distin-
guished name (DN) and the user’s public key. Therefore,
the authentication of the certiﬁcate relies on each user
possessing a unique DN. DNs use the X.500 standard [6]
and are intended to be unique across the Internet.
On the other hand, the X.509 standard [12, 13] deﬁnes
what information can go into a certiﬁcate and its data
format. All X.509 certiﬁcates have the following data, in
addition to the signature:
– Version: This ﬁeld identiﬁes which version of the
X.509 standard applies to this certiﬁcate, which af-
fects what information can be speciﬁed in it. So far,
three versions have been deﬁned.
– Serial number : The entity that created the certiﬁcate
is responsible for assigning it a serial number to distin-
guish it from other certiﬁcates it issues.
– Signature algorithm identiﬁer : This ﬁeld identiﬁes the
asymmetric algorithm used by the issuer to sign the
certiﬁcate.
– Issuer name: The DN of the issuer.
– Validity period : Each certiﬁcate is valid only for
a limited amount of time. It is not valid prior to the
activation date or beyond the expiration date.
– Subject name: The DN of the entity whose public key
the certiﬁcate identiﬁes.
1 Trust in a principal can be deﬁned as a belief that, when asked
to perform an action, the principal will act according to a prede-
ﬁned description. In particular, this belief implies the belief that
the principal will not attempt to harm the requester independently
of the way it fulﬁlls the request [21].
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– Subject public-key information: This is the public key
of the entity being named, together with an algo-
rithm identiﬁer that speciﬁes which public-key crypto
system this key belongs to and any associated key
parameters.
There are currently three X.509 versions. Version 1 has
been available since 1988. It is widely deployed and is
the most generic. Version 2 introduced the concept of
subject- and issuer-unique identiﬁers to handle the possi-
bility of reuse of subject and/or issuer names over time.
However, most certiﬁcate proﬁle documents strongly rec-
ommend that names not be reused. This is why ver-
sion 2 certiﬁcates are not widely used. Version 3 is the
most recent (1996) and supports the notion of extensions
whereby anyone can deﬁne an extension and include it
in the certiﬁcate. Extensions can be marked critical to
indicate that the extension should be checked and en-
forced. Noncritical extensions can be “silently” ignored
by certiﬁcate-using applications.
The TTP that issues the ICs is called the Certiﬁca-
tion Authority (CA). However, to deal with ICs, not only
is the CA necessary, but also an infrastructure that en-
sures the validity of electronic transactions using digital
certiﬁcates. In this sense, the PKI is responsible for the
certiﬁcates not only at the issuing time but also during
the whole lifetime of the certiﬁcate. Notice that the IC
has a bounded lifetime: it is not valid prior to the acti-
vation date or beyond the expiration date. Typically, the
validity period of a certiﬁcate ranges from several months
to several years. Certiﬁcate revocation is the mechanism
by which an issuer can revoke the binding of an identity
with a public key before the expiration of the correspond-
ing certiﬁcate. A certiﬁcate may be revoked, according
to [8], because of the loss or compromise of the associ-
ated private key, in response to a change in the owner’s
access rights, a change in the relationship with the issuer,
or as a precaution against cryptanalysis. The revocation
policies determine how the status of the certiﬁcates is dis-
tributed to the end users.
In this article, the authors explain in detail a certiﬁ-
cate revocation system based on the Merkle hash tree
(MHT) named AD–MHT. AD–MHT uses the data struc-
tures proposed by Naor and Nissim in their authenticated
dictionary (AD) [20]. This work describes the tools used
and the details of the AD–MHT implementation. The
authors also address important issues that were not ad-
dressed in the original AD proposal such as responding
to a request, revoking a certiﬁcate, deleting an expired
certiﬁcate, the status checking protocol for communicat-
ing the AD–MHT repository with users, verifying a re-
sponse, system security discussion, and, ﬁnally, perform-
ance evaluation.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In
Sect. 2, we show the reference model and the nomencla-
ture that we use to describe the revocation paradigm. In
Sect. 3, we present the related work. In Sect. 4, we dis-
Fig. 1. Reference model
cuss in detail the Merkle hash tree (MHT). In Sect. 5, we
present CRT and AD, which are both revocation systems
based on the MHT. In Sect. 6, we show the basics of the
AD–MHT. In Sect. 7, we present a status checking proto-
col for the AD–MHT. In Sect. 8, we discuss the issues re-
lated to response veriﬁcation. In Sect. 9, we present a se-
curity discussion for the AD–MHT system. In Sect. 10, we
compare the AD–MHT with the main standards, OCSP
and CRL, in terms of down-link bandwidth and process-
ing capacity consumption. Finally, we conclude the paper
in Sect. 11.
2 The certiﬁcate revocation paradigm
Figure 1 summarizes the certiﬁcate revocation paradigm.
The owner of the certiﬁcate to be revoked, an autho-
rized representative or the issuer CA, can initiate the
revocation process for this certiﬁcate. To revoke the cer-
tiﬁcate, one of the authorized entities generates a revo-
cation request and sends it to the revocation data issuer
(RDI). RDI is the term that we use to deﬁne the TTP that
has the master database of revoked certiﬁcates.2 The RDI
is also responsible for transforming its database revoca-
tion records into “status data”. The status data (hence-
forth SD) have the appropriate format to be distributed
to the End Entities and include at least the following
information:
– Certiﬁcate issuer : This is the DN of the CA that is-
sued the target certiﬁcate or certiﬁcates.
– Validity period : This period of time bounds the SD
lifetime (obviously this validity period is much smaller
than the validity period of the certiﬁcate).
– Issuer name: This is the DN of the TTP that issued
the SD.
– Cryptographic proof : This proof must demonstrate
that the SD was issued by a TTP.
2 The CA that issued the certiﬁcate is often the one who per-
forms the RDI functions for the certiﬁcate, but these functions can
be delegated to an independent TTP.
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– Serial number : This is the serial number of the target
certiﬁcate or certiﬁcates.
– Revocation date: This is the date when the target cer-
tiﬁcate was revoked.
– Revocation reason: Optionally, a revocation reason for
guidance can be speciﬁed. The revocation reason can
be unspecified, keyCompromise, cACompromise,
affiliationChanged, superseded, removeFromCRL,
cessationOfOperation, or certificateHold.
In the vast majority of the revocation systems, End Enti-
ties do not have a direct connection to the RDI. Instead,
the RDI publishes the SD in “repositories” or “respon-
ders”. The main function of both repositories and respon-
ders is to answer the End Entities’ requests concerning
the status of certiﬁcates (status checking). The diﬀer-
ence between them is that repositories are non-TTPs that
store SD precomputed by the RDI while responders are
TTPs that have a private key and that provide a sig-
nature (that serves as cryptographic proof) for each re-
sponse. Maintaining the level of security is one of the
main drawbacks of using responders, in the sense that the
responder has to be online, but at the same time it has to
protect its private key against intruders.
Certiﬁcate status checking policies can be classiﬁed in
diﬀerent ways [22]:
1. By the kind of status checking provided. The check
can be performed either “oﬄine” or “online”. Some-
times both methods are applied.
– Oﬄine scheme: the SD are precomputed by an
RDI and then distributed to the requester by a re-
pository.
– Online scheme: the SD are provided online by a re-
sponder, and a cryptographic proof is generated
during each request. This provides up-to-date in-
formation.
2. By their kinds of lists. They can be either negative or
positive. Sometimes both mechanisms are combined.
– Negative (“black”) lists contain revoked certiﬁ-
cates.
– Positive (“white”) lists contribute valid certiﬁ-
cates.
3. By the method of providing evidence.
– “Direct” evidence is given if a certiﬁcate is men-
tioned in a positive or negative list. Then it is sup-
posed to be not revoked or revoked, respectively.
– “Indirect” evidence is given if a certiﬁcate cannot
be found on a list and, therefore, the contrary is
assumed.
4. By the method of distributing information. It can be
either via a “push” or “pull” mechanism.
– Push mechanism: The repository or the responder
periodically updates the client of the revocation.
– Pull mechanism: The client asks the repository or
the responder for SD.
It is worth mentioning that status checking is the mech-
anism that has the greatest impact on the overall per-
formance of the certiﬁcate revocation system. Therefore,
status checking needs to be fast, eﬃcient, and timely and
must scale well, too. It is therefore necessary to reduce the
number of time-consuming calculations like generation
and veriﬁcation of digital signatures and to minimize the
amount of data transmitted.
3 Related work
In this section, we brieﬂy present the main approaches
and standards related to certiﬁcate revocation.
The Certiﬁcate Management Protocol (CMP) [2] de-
ﬁnes the mechanisms for requesting, renewing, reissuing,
and revoking a certiﬁcate. In particular, CMP deﬁnes the
revocation request format and the protocol for publishing
the SD.
On the other hand, there are many status checking
approaches that deﬁne diﬀerent formats of SD to be ex-
changed with the End Entities. The simplest of these is
the traditional certiﬁcate revocation list (CRL). CRL is
the most mature approach and has been part of X.509
since its ﬁrst version. CRL has also been proﬁled for the
Internet in [9]. A CRL is a digitally signed list of revoked
certiﬁcates in which for each entry within the list the
following information is stored: the certiﬁcate serial num-
ber, the revocation reason, and the revocation date.3 The
CRL also has a header that includes information about
the version, the CRL serial number, the issuer, the algo-
rithm used to sign, the signature, the issuing date, the
expiration date, and some optional ﬁelds called exten-
sions. The CA that issued the certiﬁcate acts as RDI, and
repositories can be used to distribute the CRLs. Since
CRLs may be large, they are usually cached by the client
during their validity period.
Overissued CRL (O–CRL) [7] addresses a way of re-
ducing the peak request rate of CRLs toward the repos-
itories by allowing multiple CRLs to have overlapping
validity periods. O–CRL simply consists in issuing more
than just one CRL during a validity period.
Indirect CRL (I–CRL) enables an RDI to pick revo-
cation records up from multiple CAs to be issued within
a single CRL.
Delta CRL (D–CRL) is an attempt to reduce the size
of the CRLs. A D–CRL is a small CRL that provides in-
formation about the certiﬁcates whose status has changed
since the issuance of a complete list called Base–CRL.
CRL distribution points (CRL–DP) were introduced
in version 3 of X.509. In CRL–DP, each CRL contains
the status information about a certain subgroup of certiﬁ-
cates. Each subgroup is associated with a CRL distribu-
tion point, which can be located on diﬀerent repositories.
Each certiﬁcate has a pointer to the location of its CRL
3 A revoked certiﬁcate must be placed in a CRL for at least one
issue period past its expiry to ensure that the event is recorded.
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distribution point, so there is no need to either search
through distribution points or have a priori knowledge
of the revocation information locations. The criteria for
creating these subgroups can be geographic, level of im-
portance, scope of use, etc.
mihnus.05emThe certiﬁcate revocation tree (CRT) [14]
and the authenticated dictionary (AD) [20] are both based
on the Merkle hash tree (MHT) [15]. The MHT allows
content to be retrieved in a trusted fashion with only
a small amount of trusted data. The MHT content is
stored in the leaves of the tree. A leaf is combined with
other leaves by hashing their contents to generate a node
in the upper level of the tree. By recursively applying this
computation, the last level of the tree only contains one
node that is called the “root”. The RDI signs the root dig-
itally to ensure authenticity and integrity of the MHT.
The revocation status of a certiﬁcate can be determined
by traversing the tree and verifying that the root node is
properly signed and that the traversed nodes are crypto-
graphically bound to the root (we discuss these systems
further in Sects. 4 and 5).
Micali proposed the certiﬁcate revocation system
(CRS) [16], recently renamed Novomodo [17]. In CRS/
Novomodo, two parameters are added to the IC to aid
the revocation system. CRS/Novomodo involves sev-
eral problems, one of the most serious being the high
amount of communication resources needed in the re-
vocation publication (it is necessary to update the SD
for every single issued certiﬁcate, whether or not it is
revoked). A way to reduce the resource consumption of
CRS/Novomodo in the revocation publication is sug-
gested in [4]. The system is called the hierarchical certiﬁ-
cate revocation scheme (HRCS).
The Online Certiﬁcate Status Protocol (OCSP) has
been proposed by the PKIX workgroup of the IETF [19].
OCSP enables certiﬁcate-using applications to determine
the revocation status of an identiﬁed certiﬁcate. In OCSP,
the status of certiﬁcates is available from a responder
through a request/response mechanism. An OCSP client
issues a status request to an OCSP responder and sus-
pends the acceptance of the certiﬁcate in question until
the responder provides a response. The responder signs
online each response it produces. The OCSP responses
can contain three times:
– thisUpdate is the time at which the status being indi-
cated is known to be correct.
– nextUpdate is the time at or before which newer in-
formation will be available about the status of the
certiﬁcate.
– producedAt is the time at which the OCSP responder
signed this response.
4 TheMerkle hash tree (MHT)
TheMHT [15] relies on the properties of the OWHFs (one
way hash functions). It exploits the fact that an OWHF is
Fig. 2. Sample MHT
at least 10,000 times faster to compute than a digital sig-
nature, so the majority of the cryptographic operations
performed in the revocation system are hash functions in-
stead of digital signatures. A sample MHT is represented
in Fig. 2.
We denote by Ni,j the nodes within the MHT where
i and j represent, respectively, the i-th level and the
j-th node. We denote by Hi,j the cryptographic variable
stored by node Ni,j . Nodes at level 0 are called “leaves”
and they represent the data stored in the tree. In the case
of revocation, leaves represent the set Φ of certiﬁcates
that have been revoked,
Φ = {c0, c1, . . . , cj , . . . , cn} , (1)
where cj is the data stored by leafN0,j . ThenH0,j is com-
puted as Eq. 2
H0,j = h(cj) , (2)
where h is an OWHF.
To build the MHT, a set of t adjacent nodes at a given
level i; Ni,j , Ni,j+1, . . . ,Ni,j+t−1 are combined into one
node in the upper level, which we denote byNi+1,k. Then
Hi+1,k is obtained by applying h to the concatenation of
the t cryptographic variables (Eq. 3)
Hi+1,k = h(Hi,j |Hi,j+1| . . . |Hi,j+t−1). (3)
At the top level there is only one node called the
“root”. Hroot is a digest for all the data stored in the
MHT.
The sample MHT of Fig. 2 is a binary tree because ad-
jacent nodes are combined in pairs to form a node in the
next level (t= 2) andHroot =H2,0.
Deﬁnition 1. The Digest is deﬁned as
Digest= {DNRDI , Hroot, V alidity Period}SIGRDI .
Deﬁnition 2. The Pathcj is deﬁned as the set of crypto-
graphic values necessary to computeHroot from the leaf cj.
Remark 1. Notice that the Digest is trusted data be-
cause it is signed by the RDI and is unique within the tree,
while Path is diﬀerent for each leaf.
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Claim. If the MHT provides a response with the proper
Pathcj and the MHT Digest, an End Entity can verify
whether cj ∈ Φ.
Example 1. Let us suppose that a certain user wants to
ﬁnd out whether c1 belongs to the sample MHT of Fig. 2.
Then,
Pathc1 = {N0,0, N1,1},
Digest= {DNRDI , H2,0, V alidity Period}SIGRDI .
The response veriﬁcation consists in checking that
H2,0 computed from the Pathc1 matchesH2,0 included in
the Digest
Hroot =H2,0 = h(h(h(c1)|H0,0)|H1,1) . (4)
Remark 2. Notice that the MHT can be built by a TTP
(RDI) and distributed to a repository because a leaf can-
not be added to or deleted from Φ without modifying
Hroot, which is included in the Digest, and, as the Digest
is signed, it cannot be forged by a non-TTP.4
5 Systems based on the MHT
5.1 Certiﬁcate revocation tree (CRT)
In CRT [14], the RDI is called the CRT-issuer. A CRT-
issuer can serve more than one CA, so it must obtain the
revocation records from all the CAs served. Data stored
in the leaves are expressed as a sequence of statements
for each participating CA. Each statement is a condition
on the serial numbers of the certiﬁcates and on which CA
issued them. Statements are ordered sequentially rela-
tive to a given CA, and the set of statements for a given
CA is also sequentially ordered relative to all the other
known CAs. We now show a sample CRT statement liter-
ally taken from [14].
cj : CAx = CA2 and 156≤X < 343 (5)
The statement cj indicates that the certiﬁcate with
serial number X = 156 issued by CA2 has been
revoked, while the certiﬁcates with serial numbers
from X = 157 to X = 343 (both included) issued by
CA2 have not been revoked.
A possibility for computing H0,j for cj can be
H0,j = h(CA2|156|343) . (6)
On the other hand, CRT is a binary balanced tree:
– binary because each internal node within the tree has
no more than two children ((t ∈ {1, 2}),
– balanced because there is the same number of levels
from any leaf within the tree to the root.
4 To modify Hroot, an attacker needs to ﬁnd a preimage of
an OWHF, which is computationally infeasible by deﬁnition.
If the CRT is formed by an odd number of leaves, there
is a leaf N0,n−1 that does not have a pair. Then the sin-
gle node is simply carried forward to the upper level by
hashing itsH0,n−1 value.
The main drawback of CRT is the management of dy-
namism of the binary tree. That is, searching, adding, and
removing a leaf might be performed in the worst case in
o(n) [3], where n is the number of leaves. This is an im-
portant problem taking into account that the freshness
requirements of the revocation may lead the MHT to be
updated frequently.
5.2 The authenticated dictionary (AD)
The AD improves the management of the tree dynamism
because the tree structure chosen to build theMHT is a 2–
3 tree. A 2–3 tree is a balanced tree in which each internal
node has two or three children (t ∈ {2, 3}). The main ad-
vantage of this type of tree is that management tasks such
as searching, adding, and removing a leaf canbeperformed
in o(log(n)) [3], where n is the number of leaves.
Certiﬁcates are distinguished in the MHT by their se-
rial numbers, and each leaf within the tree represents
a certiﬁcate. On the other hand, leaves are ordered by se-
rial number.
At this point a new question arises: How does one
demonstrate that a certain certiﬁcate has not been re-
voked? In other words, how does one prove that a certain
target certiﬁcate identiﬁed by serial number ctarget does
not belong to the set of revoked certiﬁcates Φ?
To prove that ctarget /∈ Φ, as the leaves are ordered,
it is enough to demonstrate the existence of two leaves,
a minor adjacent (cminor) and a major adjacent
(cmajor) that fulﬁll:
1. cmajor ∈ Φ;
2. cminor ∈ Φ;
3. cminor < ctarget < cmajor ;
4. cminor and cmajor are adjacent nodes.
6 AD-MHT basics
Bandwidth and processing capacity are critical bottle-
necks in implementing revocation systems, so any imple-
mentation of a revocation system must deal with these
parameters, which greatly aﬀect scalability. MHT-based
systems seem to avoid some of the OCSP and CRL scala-
bility drawbacks, but to our knowledge there are no pub-
lished implementations of such a system.
6.1 Tools used by AD–MHT
– AD–MHT has been developed in JAVA because its use
is widespread in networking applications and because
of its platform independency.5
5 The software for the client and the server can be downloaded
from http://isg.upc.es/cervantes
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– j2sdk v.1.4.1 has been used because it contains the
Java Cryptography Extension (JCE) API. We take
advantage of this API, which allows an easy use of the
diﬀerent security tools such as symmetric encryption,
public-key cryptography, certiﬁcate management, key
management, etc.
– Sun and SunJSSE have been used as cryptographic
providers.
– SHA1 has been used as OWHF.
– The signatures are performed using RSA with SHA1.
– Snacc4Java v2.3 is used as the ASN.1-to-Java com-
piler.
– PostgreSQL v7.2.2 is used as the database technol-
ogy, but it can be replaced with any other SQL-
based database that can be accessed though the JDBC
API.6
6.2 The JAVA architecture
Next we describe the ﬁelds that contain the two main
JAVA objects in the implementation: the “2–3 tree” and
the “node”.
The “2–3 tree” is represented through a JAVA object
that contains the following ﬁelds:
– the number of levels of the tree,
– the DN of the RDI,
– the private key used to sign the Digest,
– the validity period of the Digest,
– a reference to the root node.
The JAVA object that represents a “node” of the tree has
the following ﬁelds:
– a reference to the left child; this reference is null if the
node is a leaf (i.e., the node does not have children).
– a reference to the middle child; this reference is null if
the node is a leaf;
– a reference to the right child; this reference is null if
the node is a leaf or if it has two children;
– the biggest element of the subtree that descends from
this node, which is denoted bymax;
– the smallest element of the subtree that descends from
this node, which is denoted bymin;
– the cryptographic value (Hi,j);
– a Boolean to indicate whether or not the node is a leaf;
if the node is a leaf, it has the following data in add-
ition to the previous ﬁelds:
– the revocation date,
– the revocation reason,
– a certiﬁcate identiﬁer formed by the serial number,
a hash of the DN of the certiﬁcate issuer (CA), and
a hash of the public key used by the issuer (CA) to
sign the certiﬁcate.
Figure 3 shows a sample 2–3 tree that represents a set of
revoked certiﬁcates Φ = {2, 5, 7, 8, 12, 16, 19}.
6 We chose PostgreSQL because it is open source and is also very
stable.
Fig. 3. Sample 2-3 tree
Fig. 4. AD-MHT server side
Notice that an internal node has only two or three chil-
dren. If it has two children, these are the “left” and “mid-
dle” ones, and if it has three children these are the “left”,
“middle”, and “right” ones. In other words, an internal
node always has “left” and “middle” children. A leaf has
no children and min=max= cj . Leaves are ordered in
the following way: leaves on the left represent smaller se-
rial numbers than leaves on the right.
As mentioned in Sect. 2, apart from the data that
identify the certiﬁcate that has been revoked, revocation
systems provide the reason and the date of revocation. To
add this information to the MHT, we need to include it in
the computation of the cryptographic value of the corres-
ponding leaf (Eq. 7):
H0,j = h{CertID|Reason|Date}. (7)
Currently the RDI and the AD–MHT repository are
implemented within the same program, and there are two
MHTs (Fig. 4).
The “listening tree” is used by the repository to lis-
ten for status checking requests (the default TCP port
is 4321). The listening tree is used to generate the re-
sponses, and it is immutable during the validity period.
On the other hand, the RDI listens for the revocation re-
quests (the default TCP port is 1234) and updates the
“management tree”. After a validity period the manage-
ment tree is cloned and the listening tree replaced with
the clone.
6.3 How to respond to a request
As pointed out in Sect. 5, the response varies according
to whether or not the requested certiﬁcate belongs to the
MHT.
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If ctarget ∈ Φ, we need to provide the user with the
Path from the target leaf to the root. Next, we propose
a recursive algorithm that starts from the root and goes
across the tree until the target leaf is reached. During this
trip through the tree, the algorithm ﬁnds the Path for the
target leaf.
To sum up, when the algorithm has reached a certain
internal node denoted by Ni, it decides the next node to
go to (denoted by Ni−1) and adds the siblings of Ni−1
to the Path. The algorithm is presented below in pseu-
docode.
While (Ni = leaf){
If (Ni has two children){
If (ctarget <Ni.middle.min){
Ni−1 =Ni.left
#Ni.middle is included in Path
Ni.middlePath
}
Else {
Ni−1 =Ni.middle
Ni.leftPath
}
}
If (Ni has three children){
If (ctarget <Ni.middle.min){
Ni−1 =Ni.left
Ni.middlePath
Ni.rightPath
}
Else if (ctarget <Ni.right.min){
Ni−1 =Ni.middle
Ni.leftPath
Ni.rightPath
}
Else {
Ni−1 =Ni.right
Ni.leftPath
Ni.middlePath
}
The above algorithm is illustrated by an example in
Fig. 5.
Example 2.
1. Start on the root.
[See Fig. 5# root =N2,0, ctarget = 16.]
2. Choose next node.
[See Fig. 5#N1,2.]
3. Add siblings to Path.
[See Fig. 5# {N1,0, N1,1} Path.]
4. Choose next node.
[See Fig. 5#N0,5.]
5. Add siblings to Path.
[See Fig. 5#N0,6Path.]
6. The algorithm ends because the target leaf has been
reached.
[See Fig. 5# ctarget = 16.]
Fig. 5. Example: searching a revoked certiﬁcate
If ctarget /∈ Φ, we need to ﬁnd the two adjacent leaves
to the target certiﬁcate. Notice that if ctarget /∈ Φ and we
follow the algorithm previously described, we will get the
Path of the minor adjacent of ctarget. To ﬁnd the major
adjacent, we need a similar algorithm using other border
lines, which is why the “node” object includes the max
parameter.
6.4 Revoking a certiﬁcate
When a certiﬁcate has been revoked, it must be inserted
in the MHT. The algorithm that we propose for inserting
a revoked certiﬁcate in the MHT is depicted below and is
also illustrated by an example in Fig. 6.
1. Start searching the target leaf.
[See Fig. 6-A# ctarget = 9.]
2. The search is stopped at level 1, denoted byN1,j .
[See Fig. 6-A#N1,j =N1,1.]
3. If N1,j has “2” children, then
(a) ctarget is inserted as child ofN1,j in the correct pos-
ition.
(b)N1,j.max, N1,j .min andH1,j are updated.
(c) Now the resulting tree is balanced. We recalculate
theHi,j from the leaf we are at to the root, and the
algorithm ends.
4. If N1,j has “3” children, ctarget would be the fourth
child, which is not possible in a 2–3 tree by deﬁnition.
Then,
(a)N1,j is split and a new node is created. We denote
it byN1,j+1.
[See Fig. 6-B#N1,j+1 =N1,2.]
(b)The two leaves with the smaller serial number re-
main as children ofN1,j , while the other two leaves
become children ofN1,j+1.
(c)N1,j.max,N1,j .min,H1,j, N1,j+1.max,N1,j+1.min
andH1,j+1 are updated.
The father of N1,j is denoted byN2,k.
[See Fig. 6-B#N2,k =N2,0.]
5. N1,j+1 must be inserted as a child of N2,k. To insert
the new child, the algorithm is applied recursively.
In the last instance, the root node may be split. In this
case, a new root is created whose children will be the old
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Fig. 6. Example: inserting a revoked certiﬁcate (with root
splitting)
root and the new node. The root splitting is how the tree
grows [see Fig. 6-C#.]
6.5 Deleting an expired certiﬁcate
When a certiﬁcate reaches the end of its documented life-
time, it is said that the certiﬁcate has expired. It makes no
sense to have expired certiﬁcates in revocation databases
since they are not valid. The algorithm for deleting an ex-
pired certiﬁcate is rather complicated; we illustrate this in
Fig. 7.
1. Start searching the target leaf. We denote this byN0,j
[see Fig. 7-A# ctarget = 7,N0,j =N0,2].
2. If the target leaf is not found, the algorithm is aborted.
We denote by N1,k the father of N0,j [see Fig. 7-A#
N1,k =N1,1].
Fig. 7. Example: deleting an expired certiﬁcate
3. If N1,k has “3” children, then
(a)N0,j is deleted.
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(b)The children ofN1,k are placed in their correct pos-
ition.
(c)N1,k.max, N1,k.min andH1,k are updated.
(d)Now the resulting tree is balanced. We recalculate
theHi,j from the leaf we are at to the root, and the
algorithm ends.
4. If N1,k has “2” children, then
(a)N0,j is deleted.
Notice thatN1,k is left with only one child, which is
not possible in a 2–3 tree by deﬁnition. Thus N1,k
must be reallocatedwithin the tree [see Fig. 7-A#].
The father of N1,k is denoted by N2,m [see Fig. 7-A#
N2,m =N2,0].
5. IfN1,k =N2,m.left, then its adjacent node isN1,k+1 =
N2,m.middle. Then
(a) If N1,k+1 has “3” children,
i. N1,k+1.left is reallocated asN1,k.middle;
ii. the children of N1,k+1 are placed in the correct
position.
iii. N1,k.max, N1,k.min,H1,k, N1,k+1.max,
N1,k+1.min andH1,k+1 are updated.
iv. Now the resulting tree is balanced. We recalcu-
late the Hi,j from the leaf we are at to the root,
and the algorithm ends.
(b)If N1,k+1 has “2” children, then
i. The child of N1,k is reallocated asN1,k+1.left;
ii. the children of N1,k+1 are placed in the correct
position.
iii. N1,k is deleted.
iv. If N2,m has been left with “2” children, the re-
sulting tree is balanced. We recalculate theHi,j
from the leaf we are at to the root, and the algo-
rithm ends.
v. If N2,m has been left with only “1” child,
the algorithm must be applied recursively [see
Figs. 7-B, 7-C, and 7-D#].
6. IfN1,k=N2,m.middle, its adjacent nodes areN1,k−1 =
N2,m.left andN1,k+1=N2,m.right.
(a) If N1,k−1 has “3” children, then
i. N1,k−1.right is reallocated asN1,k.left.
ii. The children ofN1,k−1 are placed in the correct
position.
iii. N1,k.max, N1,k.min,H1,k, N1,k−1.max,
N1,k−1.min andH1,k−1 are updated.
iv. Now the resulting tree is balanced. We recalcu-
late the Hi,j from the leaf we are at to the root,
and the algorithm ends.
(b)Else if N1,k+1 exists and has “3” children,
i. N1,k+1.left is reallocated asN1,k.middle.
ii. The children ofN1,k+1 are placed in the correct
position.
iii. N1,k.max, N1,k.min,H1,k, N1,k+1.max,
N1,k+1.min andH1,k+1 are updated.
iv. Now the resulting tree is balanced. We recalcu-
late the Hi,j from the leaf we are at to the root,
and the algorithm ends.
(c) Else if N1,k−1 and N1,k+1 have both “2” children,
then
i. The child ofN1,k is reallocated asN1,k−1.right.
ii. N1,k is deleted.
iii. N1,k−1.max, N1,k−1.min and H1,k−1 are up-
dated;
iv. now the resulting tree is balanced. We recalcu-
late the Hi,j from the leaf we are at to the root,
and the algorithm ends.
(d)Else if N1,k+1 = null and N1,k−1 has “2” children,
then
i. The child ofN1,k is reallocated asN1,k−1.right.
ii. N1,k is deleted. Notice that N2,m is left with
only one child, which is not possible in a 2–3
tree by deﬁnition. To reallocateN2,m, the algo-
rithm must be applied recursively.
7. IfN1,k=N2,m.right, then its adjacent node isN1,k−1=
N2,m.middle.
(a) If N1,k−1 has “3” children, then
i. N1,k−1.right is reallocated asN1,k.left.
ii. The children of N1,k−1 and N1,k are placed in
the correct position.
(b)N1,k.max, N1,k.min,H1,k,N1,k−1.max,
N1,k−1.min andH1,k−1 are updated.
(c) Now the resulting tree is balanced. We recalculate
theHi,j from the leaf we are at to the root, and the
algorithm ends.
(d)If N1,k−1 has “2” children, then
(e) The child of N1,k is reallocated asN1,k−1.right.
(f) N1,k−1.max, N1,k−1.min andH1,k−1 are updated.
(g)N1,k is deleted.
(h)Now the resulting tree is balanced. We recalculate
theHi,j from the leaf we are at to the root, and the
algorithm ends.
7 AD–MHT status checking protocol
At the moment, most of the protocols and data struc-
tures used in computer security are deﬁned in ASN.1.
ASN.1 (Abstract Syntax Notation number One) [10] is an
international standard that aims to provide means to for-
mally specify data structures independent of machine or
transfer syntax. Therefore, one can deﬁne with ASN.1 the
protocol data units (PDUs) to be exchanged between het-
erogeneous systems.
An ASN.1 PDU deﬁnition consists of an ASCII ﬁle
that contains the data structures and the messages used
in a certain protocol. The ASN.1 PDUs are encoded with
one of several standardized encoding rules to produce
an eﬃcient bit-pattern representation that can be later
transmitted. In particular, Distinguished Encoding Rules
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(DER) [11] are widely used in security protocols because
DER are intended for applications in which given an
ASN.1 value a unique bit-pattern encoding is possible.
This is the case when a digital signature must be com-
puted on an ASN.1 value.
DER-encoded PDUs are an array of bits that can be
transported over many mechanisms such as raw sock-
ets, HTTP, SMTP, LDAP, etc. Our implementation only
supports raw sockets and HTTP as transport mechan-
isms. However, this itself does not involve a great loss of
interoperability because HTTP is the most widespread
transport mechanism among the PKI products. When
HTTP is used as the transport protocol, the HTTP
header contains the Content-Type set to the proper
MIME type7 and the Content-Length set to the total
length in bytes (including the header), while the body
contains the bit-pattern corresponding to the DER en-
coded PDU.
Below, the authors propose a request/response proto-
col devised in ASN.1 to perform the status checking in
the AD–MHT. The protocol imports ASN.1 deﬁnitions
from [19] and [9].
7.1 The AD–MHT request
Figure 8 shows the ASN.1 description for an AD–MHT
request. Each request contains:
– the protocol version (currently version 1),
– a unique identiﬁer for each target certiﬁcate (CertID),
– (optionally) the request signed by the client.
Upon receipt of a request, the repository determines
whether the message is well formed, whether it is conﬁg-
ured to provide the requested service, and whether the
request contains the compulsory information. If any one
of the prior conditions is not met, the repository produces
a response with an error message that is indicated in
MHTResponseStatus (Fig. 9). Otherwise, it returns a re-
sponse with the appropriate status data.
7 We propose reserving the following MIME types for the AD–
MHT system:
– application/admht-request
– application/admht-response.
ADMHTRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsRequest ADMHTTBSRequest,
optionalSignature [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL }
ADMHTTBSRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] EXPLICIT Version OPTIONAL,
requestList SEQUENCE OF ADMHTCertRequest }
ADMHTCertRequest ::= SEQUENCE {reqCert CertID }
CertID ::= SEQUENCE {
issuerName [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,--Hash of the issuer (CA) DN
issuerKeyHash [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,--Hash of the issuer (CA) public-key
serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber }
CertificateSerialNumber ::= OCTET STRING
Fig. 8. ASN.1 description of the AD-MHT request
7.2 The AD–MHT response
Figure 9 shows the ASN.1 description for an AD–MHT
response. The response syntax is more complex than the
request since it must include the Digest of the tree and
one or two Paths for each target certiﬁcate. (Remem-
ber that we need to prove the existence of the minor and
major adjacent leaves to ensure that a certiﬁcate is not
revoked.)
The BasicADMHTResponse contains:
– a SignedTreeDigest common to all the target certiﬁ-
cates,
– a SingleADMHTResponse per target certiﬁcate.
The SignedTreeDigest includes:
– the issuer, that is, the DN of the RDI,
– the validityPeriod.
– The rootHash inclusion is optional because the client
can calculate it from the Path, even though the
RDI must include the rootHash in the signature
computation.
The SingleADMHTResponse includes the information ne-
cessary to check whether or not the target certiﬁcate has
been revoked:
– If minorAdjacent = majorAdjacent, the certiﬁcate
has been revoked. Then only the minorAdjacent is in-
cluded in the Path.
– If minorAdjacent = majorAdjacent, the target cer-
tiﬁcate has not been revoked. Then Paths from both
adjacent leaves must be included in the response.
The TreePath includes:
– the adjacentID that uniquely identiﬁes the target
certiﬁcate,
– the status, which includes the revocation date and
the revocation reason,
– the PathSteps that allowHroot to be computed recur-
sively.
Each PathStep contains:
– the cryptographic value(s) necessary to compute
a cryptographic value in the upper level,
– the next PathStep (in the last instance, the root is
reached).
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ADMHTResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
responseStatus MHTResponseStatus,
basicResponse [0] EXPLICIT BasicADMHTResponse OPTIONAL }
BasicADMHTResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
signedTreeDigest SignedTreeDigest,
singleResponse SingleADMHTResponse }
MHTResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED {
successful (0), --Response has valid confirmations
malformedRequest (1), --Illegal confirmation request
internalError (2), --Internal error in issuer
tryLater (3), --Try again later
--(4) and (5) are not used
unauthorized (6) } --Request unauthorized
SignedTreeDigest ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsTreeDigest TBSTreeDigest,
signature OCTET STRING } --SHA1 with RSA is used
TBSTreeDigest ::= SEQUENCE {
issuer Name, --DN of the RDI
validity Validity,
rootHash [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
extensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
SingleADMHTResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
minorAdjacent TreePath,
majorAdjacent [0] EXPLICIT TreePath OPTIONAL \} --Only needed for not revoked certificates
TreePath ::= SEQUENCE {
adjacentID CertID,
status RevokedInfo,
firstPathStep PathStep }
PathStep ::= SEQUENCE { --SHA1 is used
leftHash [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
middleHash [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
rightHash [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
nextPathStep [3] EXPLICIT PathStep OPTIONAL }
RevokedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
revocationTime GeneralizedTime,
revocationReason [0] EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL }
Fig. 9. ASN.1 description of the AD-MHT response
The algorithm that allows Hroot to be computed is de-
picted below:
1. The i-th PathStep allowsHi+1 to be computed. Hi+1
can be a leftHash, a middleHash, or a rightHash in
the (i+1)-th level.
2. IfHi+1 is a leftHash,
(a) if the (i+1)-th level has “2” nodes, then the
nextPathStepwill include only a middleHash;
(b)if the (i+1)-th level has “3” nodes, then the
nextPathStep will include a middleHash and
a rightHash.
3. IfHi+1 is a middleHash, then
(a) if the (i+1)-th level has “2” nodes, then the next-
PathStepwill include only a leftHash;
(b)if the (i+1)-th level has “3” nodes, then the next-
PathStep will include a leftHash and a right-
Hash.
4. If Hi+1 is a rightHash, then the nextPathStep will
include a leftHash and a middleHash.
8 Response veriﬁcation
In this section, we resolve some open issues related to re-
sponse veriﬁcation that were not addressed in the original
AD proposal.
8.1 Adjacent node checking
First of all, the client must check that each TreePath
included in the response is correct, that is, that the
rootHash computed from thePathmatches the rootHash
included in the Digest.
If a target certiﬁcate has not been revoked, this is
not enough; the client also needs to ensure that the
TreePaths provided belong to real adjacent nodes. (Re-
member that the repository is a non-TTP, so the user
can be misled into believing that a certain pair of nodes
within the tree are adjacent leaves.)
Example 3. Let us suppose that we want to perform
a transaction using a given certiﬁcate. The certiﬁcate is
identiﬁed by ctarget. Using the example in Fig. 3, let us
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assume that ctarget = 16. Notice that ctarget ∈ Φ, but let
us suppose that a malicious repository provides us with
the Path for two leaves that belong to the MHT, claiming
that they are adjacent. For instance, let us assume that
these leaves are cminor = 8 and cmajor = 19. If we only
check that {cminor, cmajor} ∈Φ, we will think that ctarget
is valid and we will perform the fraudulent transaction.
Next, the authors propose a recursive algorithm that,
given a certain couple of TreePaths, veriﬁes whether they
actually belong to “real” adjacent leaves. The algorithm
works without adding any extra information to the proto-
col or the data structures. The alleged adjacent leaves are
denoted byN0,j andN0,j+1.
1. The client computesH1,m andH1,n, which denote, re-
spectively, the cryptographic values of the fathers of
N0,j andN0,j+1.
2. IfH1,m =H1,n, then both leaves have the same father.
Then,
(a) if N0,j = N1,m.left and N0,j+1 = N1,m.middle,
they are adjacent nodes;
(b)if N0,j = N1,m.middle and N0,j+1 = N1,m.right,
they are adjacent nodes;
(c) else, they are not adjacent nodes.
3. If H1,m =H1,n, then the leaves do not have the same
father. Then,
(a) if N1,m has “2” children and N0,j =N1,m.middle,
they are not adjacent nodes;
(b)if N1,m has “3” children and N0,j = N1,m.right,
they are not adjacent nodes;
(c) if N0,j+1 = N1,n.left, they are not adjacent
nodes.
(d)else the client computes H2,p and H2,q, which de-
note, respectively, the cryptographic values of the
fathers of N1,m and N1,n, and she applies the al-
gorithm recursively. In the last instance, the root
is the unique common father between the pair of
nodes.
We provide some examples of the previous algorithm in
Fig. 10.
It must be pointed out that the strength of the above
algorithm resides in the position that a certain node oc-
cupies relative to its father, in other words whether a cer-
tain node is LEFT, MIDDLE, or RIGHT. Notice that
the end user can trust this information since the rela-
tive node positions cannot be swapped by a malicious
repository because we use a noncommutative hash func-
tion. If the malicious repository modiﬁes the concatena-
tion order, then it changes the cryptographic value of the
next step (Eq. 8):
Hi+1,k = h(Hi,j |Hi,j+1) = h(Hi,j+1|Hi,j) . (8)
8.2 MHT bounds
On the other hand, notice that in some cases minor adja-
cent, major adjacent, or both are missing. For instance:
Fig. 10. Examples of adjacent node checking
– If Φ = {∅}, i.e., the MHT is empty, then both adjacent
nodes are missing.
– If ctarget < cj ∀j, i.e., the serial number of the target
certiﬁcate is smaller than the smallest leaf within the
MHT, then there is no minor adjacent.
– If ctarget > cj ∀j, i.e., the serial number of the target
is bigger than the biggest leaf within the MHT, then
there is no major adjacent.
A serial number is nothing more than an array of bits.
The serial number with all its bits set to 0 and the serial
number with all its bits set to 1 are reserved (not assigned
to “real” certiﬁcates) to bound the MHT. These “special”
serial numbers represent 0 and +∞, respectively, so now
each possible serial number has two adjacent nodes inde-
pendently of the certiﬁcates contained by the MHT.
9 Security discussion
For AD–MHT to be eﬀective, certiﬁcate-using applica-
tions must connect to any of the available AD–MHT
repositories. In the event that such a connection cannot
be obtained, certiﬁcate-using applications could imple-
ment other processing logic (CRL, OCSP, etc.) as a fall-
back position.
Another important aspect that the AD–MHT admin-
istrators must take into account when deploying the sys-
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tem is that if you do not rely on HTTP as the transport
mechanism, you might get into trouble when going across
ﬁrewalls because many of them will not allow anything
but HTTP to pass through, so there could be a prob-
lem communicating end points from either side of a ﬁre-
wall. Furthermore, AD–MHT administrators should not
forget that the HTTP transport makes it possible for ﬁre-
wall administrators to conﬁgure them to selectively block
out messages using speciﬁc MIME types. Administrators
of the AD–MHT system should also take into account
the reliance of HTTP caching because it may give unex-
pected results if the AD–MHT requests or responses are
cached by intermediate servers and these servers are in-
correctly conﬁgured or are known to have cache manage-
ment faults. Therefore, AD–MHT deployments should
take into account the reliability of HTTP cache mechan-
isms when AD–MHT is used over HTTP.
Some possible attacks on the AD–MHT system in-
clude the following:
– RDImasquerade attack : An attacker or a malicious re-
pository could attempt to masquerade a trustworthy
RDI.
Countermeasures: This attack is avoidable if the client
veriﬁes the signature included in the Digest using the
correct certiﬁcate of the RDI.
– Response integrity attack : An attacker or a malicious
repository could modify part or all of a response sent
by a legitimate repository.
Countermeasures: This attack cannot be successfully
carried out if the response is veriﬁed according to the
procedure described in Sect. 8. Notice that the inher-
ent structure of the MHT together with the response
veriﬁcation algorithm make it infeasible to alter an
AD–MHT response without making it invalid: the
MHT cannot be modiﬁed without modifying the root,
which is signed, and fake adjacent nodes are detected
by the protocol presented in Sect. 8.
– Replay attack : An attacker or malicious repository
could resend an old (good) response prior to its expira-
tion date but after theDigest has changed.
Countermeasures: Decreasing the validity periods of
the responseswill decrease thewindowof vulnerability.
– Denial of service attack : An attacker could intercept
the responses from a legitimate repository and delete
them, or the attacker could delay the responses by, for
example, deliberately ﬂooding the network, thereby
introducing large transmission delays. Notice that re-
quests do not contain the repository they are directed
to, which allows an attacker to replay a request to
any number of repositories. Finally, unsigned error
responses open up the protocol to another denial of
service attack in which the attacker sends false error
responses.
Countermeasures: The only way to prevent this attack
is through redundancy of repositories, which is easy to
deploy since repositories are non-TTPs.
10 Evaluation
Many models have been proposed for evaluating PKI
components in general and certiﬁcate revocation in par-
ticular. For instance, in [18] the authors present an ana-
lytical way of modeling revocation systems, while a simu-
lation model is presented in [5]. However, a model can-
not address all the aspects of a real system and might
overlook important details. Our evaluation results are
obtained by means of a JAVA test bed called CER-
VANTES [1]. We use CERVANTES because it imple-
ments the protocols and mechanisms of a real system and
therefore provides the most reliable and accurate way of
performing evaluation. Furthermore, the performance of
particular implementations can only be evaluated with
a test bed.
In this section, overissuedCRL, OCSP, and AD–MHT
are evaluated by means of CERVANTES in terms of
– down-link (responder/repository to clients) band-
width utilization in the status checking,
– processing capacity consumed per request.
Figure 11 shows a bandwidth comparison among these
systems.
The server used for simulations is a Pentium III with
SO Linux (kernel 2.4.0). The simulated scenario has
a population of 10,000 clients in which each client has
a certiﬁcate. The revocation percentage is 10%. The x-
axis represents the requests per user per working day (we
assume that a working day has 8 h).
Table 1 shows the results for the same scenario in
terms of processing capacity per request.
CRLs are valid for 2 h; 16 CRLs are issued during a va-
lidity period and cached by the clients during this validity
period. Despite the use of cache, the CRL performance in
terms of down-link bandwidth is very poor compared to
OCSP or AD–MHT. As a result, CRLs do not seem to be
a good choice for distribution of status data among end
users and should only be used as the distribution mech-
anism for intermediate entities. OCSP is a good choice
in terms of bandwidth, but the processing capacity re-
sources it uses are the highest of the evaluated systems.
Fig. 11. Down-link bandwidth utilization in status checking for
AD-MHT, OCSP, and CRL
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Table 1. Processing capacity usage in status checking for
AD-MHT, OCSP, and CRL
Revocation Processing capacity
System per request
CRL negligible
AD-MHT 10 µs
OCSP 2000 µs
Also, responders are needed to distribute the OCSP data.
AD–MHT bandwidth performance is slightly worse than
that of OCSP, but, taking into account the overall per-
formance, the AD–MHTmight be a good choice for distri-
bution of status data among end users because it does not
require much bandwidth or processing capacity and a re-
pository can be used to respond to AD–MHT requests.
11 Conclusions
The authors present the certiﬁcate revocation paradigm
and review the main revocation systems proposed in the
literature. The article discusses in detail the design and
implementation of a certiﬁcate revocation system based
on the Merkle hash tree (MHT). The system, which is
named AD–MHT, uses the data structures proposed by
Naor and Nissim in AD. The article also describes the
tools used to implement the system. Furthermore, the
authors address some important unresolved issues that
are necessary for implementing such a system and that
were beyond the scope of the original AD proposal such as
responding to a request, revoking a certiﬁcate, deleting an
expired certiﬁcate, the communication protocol with the
end users, and the veriﬁcation of a response. On the other
hand, AD–MHT has proven to be resistant against ma-
licious behaviors such as RDI masquerading, AD–MHT
response modiﬁcation, replay attacks, or denial of service.
The AD–MHT system has been implemented as part
of the CERVANTES project [1]. We use CERVANTES
because it implements the protocols and mechanisms of
a real system and therefore provides the most reliable and
accurate way of performing evaluation.
Finally, an evaluation of the AD–MHT system vs.
CRL and OCSP has shown that, taking into account
the overall performance, the AD–MHT system might be
a good choice for distribution of status data among end
users because it does not require much bandwidth or pro-
cessing capacity and repositories can be used to respond
to AD–MHT requests.
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JDBC Java Database Connectivity
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
MHT Merkle Hash Tree
O-CRL Overissued CRL
OCSP Online Certiﬁcate Status Protocol
OWHF One-Way Hash Function
PDU Protocol Data Unit
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
RDI Revocation Data Issuer
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
SD Status Data
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SQL Structured Query Language
TCP Transport Control Protocol
TTP Trusted Third Party
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